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DEFINING THE CONTOURS OF THE INFRINGEMENT TEST IN CASES
INVOLVING THE STATE TAXATION OF NON-INDIANS A HALF-CENTURY
AFTER WILLIAMS V. LEE
Nathan Quigley*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2004, the accounting firm for Atlantic City Coin, a slot machine distributor and
lessor, made a small administrative error.1 The accounting firm mistakenly filed a
personal property tax declaration with Ledyard, Connecticut for slot machines leased to
the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe.2 The Tribe leased the slot machines for use in its
palatial and lucrative Foxwoods Resort Casino, located on the Tribe’s reservation and
within the borders of Ledyard.3 Once Ledyard received the tax declaration, it predictably
assessed its property tax against Atlantic City Coin.4 This small administrative error
ignited a large legal battle over Ledyard’s attempt to impose taxes on personal property
owned by non-Indians on the Mashantucket Pequot Reservation.
In response to Ledyard’s taxing efforts, the Tribe sought declaratory and
injunctive relief from the application of the tax in the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut.5 In September 2011, after years of litigation, both the Tribe and
Ledyard filed cross motions for summary judgment. 6 In the Tribe’s motion, it argued that
Ledyard was barred from imposing its personal property tax on the slot machines
located on the reservation for three independent reasons. 7 First, the Tribe argued that
the tax was preempted by federal statute.8 Second, the Tribe argued that federal and
tribal interests preempted the state tax under the Bracker interest-balancing test.9
Finally, the Tribe argued that the tax unlawfully infringed on its ability to “make [its] own

*

J.D. Seattle University School of Law, 2012; B.A., Colby College, 2005. Special thanks to Professor Eric
Eberhard, Bree Blackhorse, and Shay Story for their encouragement and advice on this paper.
1
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 2012 WL 1069342 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2012) at 1.
2
Id.
3
Id. at 10. Foxwoods Resort Casino is the largest casino in North America and at one time was the most
profitable casino in the United States. See generally BRETT FROMSON, HITTING THE JACKPOT: THE INSIDE
STORY OF THE RICHEST INDIAN TRIBE IN HISTORY (2003). Unfortunately for the Tribe, the casino has recently
fallen on hard times. See Michael Sokolove, Foxwoods Casino Is Fighting for Its Life, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, March 14, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18/magazine/mike-sokolovefoxwood-casinos.html?_r=1 (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
4
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 2012 WL 1069342 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2012) at 1.
5
Id. at 17–18.
6
Julianne Hanckel, Ledyard Tax Case Could Set Far-Reaching Precedent, THE DAY (NEW LONDON), Jan.
24, 2012, available at http://www.theday.com/article/20120124/NWS01/301249957/-1/NWS (last visited
Nov. 10, 2012).
7
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 2012 WL 1069342 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2012) at 1.
8
Id. at 20. Specifically, the Tribe argued that the tax was preempted by the IGRA, S. Rep. No. 100-446,
at 5 (1988), and the Indian Trader statutes, 25 U.S.C. §§ 261-264.
9
Id. at 28.
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laws and be ruled by them.” 10 The United States Supreme Court enunciated this basis
for limiting state regulation on Indian reservations in the 1959 case of Williams v. Lee.11
This principle has become known as the infringement test, and it protects the inherent
right of Indian tribes to be self-governing.12 While the infringement test remains a central
principle of Federal Indian law, the United States Supreme Court’s subsequent
jurisprudence does not make clear to what extent Williams v. Lee still stands as a
barrier to state taxation of non-Indians in Indian Country.
In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,13 the Supreme Court stated that the
infringement test is an “independent” barrier to state taxation.14 However, Indian law
scholars note that the infringement test is “seldom decisive in the tax context.” 15 For
example, Ninth Circuit Judge William C. Canby, Jr. explains that:
Although nearly all [recent cases involving state taxation of non-Indians] depend
largely or entirely upon preemption analysis, the rule of Williams v. Lee—that the
states may not interfere with the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be governed by them—has been held to be an additional, independent
limitation on the states’ power to tax. So stated, the rule would doubtless curb
any attempt of the states to tax the sovereign functions of the tribes. Where the
tax is upon nonmembers, however, the absolute prohibition of Williams v. Lee
tends to recede into the background while the courts engage in the balancing of
interests called for by the preemption approach that they prefer. When that
process results in the preemption of the state tax, the rule of Williams v. Lee is
sometimes then invoked as additional support for the result.16
It is difficult to understand why the infringement test is called an “independent
barrier” to a state’s authority to tax non-Indians on the reservation when the courts
continually decide cases by focusing on preemption with “at most a passing reference to
infringement.”17 Stated another way, how can the infringement test be an independent
limitation if it consistently “recede[s] into the background” while courts focus on
preemption?18

10

Id. at 37–38 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
12
STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 133 (3d ed. 2002).
13
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
14
Id. at 142 (“[C]ongressional authority and the ‘semi-independent position’ of Indian tribes has given rise
to two independent but related barriers to the assertion of state regulatory authority over tribal
reservations and members. First, the exercise of such authority may be preempted by federal law.
Second, it may lawfully infringe ‘on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them.’”) (citations omitted).
15
Erik M. Jensen, Taxation and Doing Business in Indian Country, 60 ME. L. REV. 1, 61 (2008).
16
WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUT SHELL 304–305 (5th ed. 2009) (internal
citations omitted) (emphasis added).
17
Jensen, supra note 15, at 61.
18
Canby, supra note 16, at 304.
11
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Acknowledging this incongruity, the Tenth Circuit recently questioned the
continuing validity of the infringement test. In Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt,19 the
court said that “some have questioned the continued applicability of the infringement
barrier . . . Based on the Supreme Court’s repeated mention of the infringement prong,
we conclude it is still a necessary part of our analysis.” 20 The Tenth Circuit is correct
that this area of the law is in need of clarification.
This paper will review the Supreme Court’s cases involving state taxation of nonIndians in Indian Country to define the current contours of the infringement test.
Specifically, this paper argues that since Williams v. Lee was decided in 1959, the
Supreme Court has substantially weakened the power of the infringement test to stand
as a barrier to state taxation of non-Indians in Indian Country. To that end, this paper
proceeds in four parts. Part II introduces Williams v. Lee and then analyzes four
Supreme Court cases that have discussed the infringement test: McClanahan v. State
Tax Commission of Arizona,21 Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the
Flathead Reservation,22 Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation,23 and White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker.24 Next, because the
infringement test “derived from notions of tribal sovereignty,” 25 Part III discusses
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe 26 and Montana v. United States,27 two cases that
drastically changed the limits of tribal sovereignty. Based on the analysis of these
cases, Part IV argues that the Supreme Court has substantially weakened the power of
the infringement test to shield non-Indians in Indian Country from state taxation. Finally,
Part V discusses how the court in Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard 28
addressed the Tribe’s infringement test argument and offers a brief conclusion.
II. T HE COURT’S ENUNCIATION AND SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION OF THE INFRINGEMENT TEST
A. Williams v. Lee (1959)
The Court enunciated the principle that has become known as the infringement
test in the landmark case, Williams v. Lee.29 Williams involved a non-Indian who owned
a general store on the Navajo Reservation and sold goods on credit to a tribal
member.30 Seeking to collect the debt, the storeowner sued the tribal member in
Arizona State court, even though a Navajo tribal court was available to hear the case. 31
19

Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt, 669 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1171 n.5.
21
McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
22
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
23
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
24
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 136.
25
Jensen, supra note 15, at 61.
26
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
27
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
28
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 2012 WL 1069342 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2012).
29
PEVAR, supra note 12, at 133.
30
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 217–18.
31
Id. at 218.
20
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The storeowner won the case, and the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the
judgment. 32 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court considered whether the
Arizona courts had jurisdiction to hear the controversy.33 The Court held that the
Arizona courts could not exercise jurisdiction over the dispute because to do so “would
undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would
infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.” 34
In Williams, Justice Black cites to Worcester v. Georgia,35 calling Chief Justice
Marshall’s 1832 opinion “courageous and eloquent.”36 The Court in Worcester
established the principle that the tribes have inherent sovereignty because they are
“distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the
undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial.”37 The Court used this
principle to invalidate Georgia’s attempts to extend its laws to the Cherokee
Reservation.38 Chief Justice Marshall said that the Cherokee nation is a “distinct
community, occupying its own territory in which the laws of Georgia can have no force,
and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress.”39
Many Indian law scholars view Williams as faithful to Worcester. For example,
Professor David H. Getches argues that the Williams Court “vindicated tribal
sovereignty in a modern context” and “confirmed the modern Court’s adherence to
foundation[al] principles [of Federal Indian law].” 40 However, Williams can also be read
as a departure from Worcester.41
In Worcester, the Court held that, absent an act of Congress or a treaty, state
action on Indian reservations was presumptively invalid because of the inherent powers
of the tribes.42 In contrast, in Williams, the Court said that “[e]ssentially, absent
governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action
infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them.” 43 This frames state action as presumptively valid; the holding of Williams allows
32

Id.
Id.
34
Id. at 223.
35
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
36
Williams, 358 U.S. at 219.
37
Worcester v. Georgia 31 U.S. at 559. The Worcester Court went on to say these original natural rights
of Indian tribes are subject to a “single exception” that “excluded them from intercourse with any other
European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed.” Id. In addition,
the Court had previously said that tribes had lost the power to freely alienate their lands. Johnson v.
M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 569 (1823).
38
Worcester v. Georgia 31 U.S. at 561.
39
Id.
40
David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in
Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1589–90 (1996).
41
See generally Dewi Ioan Ball, Williams v. Lee (1959)—50 Years Later: A Reassessment of One of the
Most Important Cases in the Modern-Era of Federal Indian Law, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 391 (2010).
42
See Worcester v. Georgia 31 U.S. at 540.
43
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 220.
33
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state action on the reservation unless it infringes on the right of reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them. 44 Thus, Williams can be viewed as a
departure from the principle of expansive inherent tribal sovereignty that could only be
modified by Congress. Moreover, it illustrated the Court’s willingness to allow state
authority on reservations.
Regardless of how faithful the decision in Williams was to Worcester, Williams
established a test that assessed the permissibility of state jurisdiction or regulation in
Indian Country. The test required courts to consider whether the challenged state action
“infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them.” 45
B. McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona (1973)
In McClanahan, the Court again considered an attempt by Arizona to impose a
tax on the Navajo Reservation.46 This time, Arizona sought to tax the earnings of an
Indian who resided on the reservation and whose income derived entirely from
reservation activities.47 In 1967, $16.20 was withheld from Ms. Rosalind McClanahan’s
wages to cover her state income tax liability.48 At the close of the tax year, Ms.
McClanahan filed a protest against the collection of the taxes and filed a claim for a
refund of the entire amount.49 When the Arizona Department of Revenue failed to
respond to her claim, Ms. McClanahan sued in the Arizona courts on behalf of herself
and other tribal members. 50 The court held that the taxation was permissible.51
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Arizona argued that a tax on the
income of individual Indians was permissible under Williams.52 The Court rejected this
argument, and said that “[i]t must be remembered that the cases applying the Williams
test have dealt principally with situations involving non-Indians. . . The problem posed in
this case is completely different.”53 Accordingly, the Court reasoned that the
infringement test was only intended to apply to attempted exercises of state jurisdiction
over non-Indians in Indian Country.54
To evaluate state attempts to tax Indians in Indian Country, the Court adopted
the preemption analysis as the applicable analytic framework:

44

See id.
Id.
46
McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona, 411 U.S. at 165.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 166.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 165.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 179. Professor Jensen points out that this statement is both inaccurate and counterintuitive.
Jensen, supra note 15, at 62 n.365.
54
See McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona 411 U.S. at 179.
45
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[T]he trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar
to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal preemption. The modern
cases thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to
look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the limits of state
power. The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it provides
a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but because it provides a
backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be
read.55
In adopting this framework, the Court in McClanahan stated that preemption “define[s]
the limits of state power.”56 This portrays state taxation as presumptively valid until it
conflicts with a federal statute or treaty. Thus, similarly to the Williams Court, the Court
in McClanahan showed a willingness to allow state regulation on the reservation.
Moreover, in the analysis endorsed by McClanahan, tribal sovereignty merely “provides
a backdrop” for the reading of federal statutes and treaties and has little force of its
own.57
Even though the Court in McClanahan said that Williams did not apply because
the appellant was an Indian, the Court’s commentary on Williams is important to later
decisions. The Court stated that:
The cases applying the Williams test have dealt principally with situations
involving non-Indians. In these situations, both the tribe and the State could fairly
claim an interest in asserting their respective jurisdiction. The Williams test was
designed to resolve this conflict by providing that the State could protect its
interest up to the point where tribal self-government would be affected.58
While this statement accurately described the Court’s decision in Williams, in a
subsequent decision, the Court cited to this section of McClanahan to further increase
the states’ power vis-à-vis the tribes in cases applying the infringement test.59
C. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation
(1976)
In Moe, the Court considered Montana’s imposition of a cigarette tax on sales by
on-reservation smoke shops operated by tribal members of the Confederated Salish
and Kootenai Tribes.60 The State tax applied to both Indian and non-Indian customers,
and the State required the tribal retailers to collect the tax. 61 The District Court of
Montana upheld the State’s jurisdiction to tax the on-reservation sales of cigarettes to
55

Id. at 172.
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 179.
59
See infra Part II.D (discussing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134 (1980)).
60
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. at 466–67.
61
Id. at 467.
56
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non-Indians and the requirement that the retailers collect this tax. 62 However, the district
court struck down the tax as applied to tribal members. 63
In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Rehnquist, the Court affirmed the
lower court, focusing almost entirely on the collection requirement. 64 The Court simply
assumed that the tax was valid as applied to non-Indians.65 With respect to the
collection requirement, the Court said that the State could require the tribal seller to
collect the tax imposed on non-Indians because it was “a minimal burden designed to
avoid the likelihood that in its absence non-Indian purchasers from the tribal sellers will
avoid payment of a concededly lawful tax.” 66 The Court called the collection requirement
a “minimal burden” and said that “[w]e see nothing in this burden which frustrates tribal
self-government [in violation of Williams] or runs afoul of any congressional enactments
dealing with the affairs of Indians.”67 The Court characterized this as a burden on tribal
members rather than as a burden on the tribal government.
In the wake of Moe, there was support for the proposition that a state can require
tribal members to collect state taxes without infringing on a tribe’s right to selfgovernance. Moreover, the Moe Court concluded that a state could cross a reservation
boundary to impose a tax on non-Indians. This result played an important role in
establishing Justice Rehnquist’s theory of implied divestiture. According to this theory,
Indian tribes have impliedly lost certain sovereign powers, such as jurisdiction over nonIndians, due to their incorporation into the United States.68 This theory is crucial to
understanding the result in this case. The Court was able to conclude that Montana’s
tax did not frustrate tribal self-governance because, under the theory of implied
divestiture, tribal self-governance was implicated when the State taxed tribal members,
but not when the State taxed non-members.69
D. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation (1980)
In Colville, the Court considered Washington’s attempt to tax the cigarette sales
of several tribes.70 In contrast to the tribes in Moe, the tribes challenging the state tax in
Colville had imposed their own taxing regimes on cigarette sales.71
The Colville Court concluded that the tribes’ tax regimes did not preclude
Washington from also levying a tax on the on-reservation sale of cigarettes to non62

Id.
Id. at 468.
64
See id. at 481–483.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 483.
67
Id.
68
See infra Part III; see also Mark Trahant, High Court Could Use an Indian Voice, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, July 9, 2005, available at http://www.seattlepi.com/local/opinion/article/High-court-coulduse-an-Indian-voice-1177919.php (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
69
See infra Part IV.
70
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 at 139.
71
Id. at 138.
63
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members.72 The Court said that “[w]e do not believe that the principles of Federal Indian
law, whether stated in terms of preemption, tribal self-government, or otherwise,
authorize Indian tribes thus to market an exemption from state taxation to persons who
would normally do their business elsewhere.”73 First, the Court said that the federal
statutes do not preempt the Washington sales and cigarette tax. 74 In addition, the Court
said that under Williams, the State did “not infringe on the right of reservation Indians to
‘make their own laws and be ruled by them’ merely because the result of imposing its
taxes will be to deprive the Tribes of revenues which they currently are receiving.” 75
The Court’s next sentence is perhaps the most troubling because it incorrectly
interpreted the Court’s commentary in McClanahan discussing Williams.76 It cited
McClanahan for the following proposition: “The principle of tribal self-government,
grounded in notions of inherent sovereignty and congressional policies, seeks an
accommodation between the interests of the Tribes and Federal Government, on the
one hand, and those [interests] of the State, on the other.”77 This statement
foreshadowed what would become the Bracker interest-balancing test and infused a
consideration of the state’s interest into the Court’s infringement analysis.
However, it is a stretch to find support for this proposition in McClanahan. The
closest support for the Court’s statement comes from the following portion of
McClanahan: “The Williams test was designed to resolve this conflict by providing that
the State could protect its interest up to the point where tribal self-government would be
affected.”78 But instead of considering the state interest involved, this statement says
that state jurisdiction would be tolerated only if there was no infringement on tribal selfgovernment. Considering the state’s interest as part of the infringement analysis, as the
Court did in Colville, is very different than permitting state action unless it infringes on
the right of tribal self-government, as the Williams test prescribes. For example, under
Williams, even a very strong state interest would not permit state regulation if it infringed
on tribal self-government.79 However, the Court in Colville posed state interest as a
factor in determining when taxation is permissible. Colville continued the trend of
reducing the importance of tribal sovereignty while increasing the significance of the
states’ interest in the Court’s infringement analysis. As Justice Rehnquist noted in his
concurrence in Colville, “[a]t issue here is not only Indian sovereignty, but also
necessarily state sovereignty as well.”80

72

Id. at 155.
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 156.
76
See supra Part II.B.
77
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. at 156 (emphasis
added).
78
McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona, 411 U.S. at 179.
79
Ball, supra note 41, at 401 (citing CANBY, supra note 16, at 243–244).
80
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. at 181 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
73
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E. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker (1980)
Seventeen days after the Court decided Colville, the Court issued its decision in
Bracker.81 Bracker involved Arizona’s attempts to impose its motor carrier license tax
and motor fuel excise tax on the non-Indian contractors of a tribal timber business
operated by the White Mountain Apache Tribe. 82 The United States Supreme Court held
that federal law, specifically the federal government’s comprehensive regulation of the
harvesting of Indian timber, preempted the state taxes at issue.83
Most courts called upon to analyze the permissibility of the state taxation of nonIndians cite to Bracker for the general rules regarding taxation in Indian Country.84 In
Bracker, the Court stated that infringement and preemption are independent barriers to
state regulatory authority on the reservation:
Congress has broad power to regulate tribal affairs under the Indian Commerce
Clause. This congressional power and the ‘semi-independent position’ of Indian
tribes have given rise to two independent but related barriers to the assertion of
state regulatory authority over tribal reservations and members. First, the
exercise of such authority may be preempted by federal law. Second, it may
unlawfully infringe ‘on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and
be ruled by them.’ The two barriers are independent because either, standing
alone, can be a sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable to activity
undertaken on the reservation by tribal members.85
Next, the Court explained how these barriers are related:
[The two barriers] are related, however, in two important ways. The right of tribal
self-government is ultimately dependent on and subject to the broad power of
Congress. Even so, traditional notions of Indian self-government are so deeply
engrained in our jurisprudence that they have provided an important “backdrop,”
against which vague or ambiguous federal enactments must always be
measured.86

81

DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 614 (6th ed. 2011).
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 at 137-138.
83
Id. at 138.
84
See e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); Ramah Navajo School Board
Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
85
Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142–143 (emphasis added).
86
Id. at 143 (emphasis added). This statement is problematic because it describes the role of tribal selfgovernance as being similar in both the infringement analysis and the preemption analysis. However, the
role of tribal sovereignty is considerably different in the two analyses. In the preemption analysis, Indian
sovereignty provides a “backdrop” against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be
read. In contrast, in the infringement analysis, tribal sovereignty is the focus of the analysis. This quote
from Bracker does not modify the infringement analysis, but it does result in considerable confusion.
Courts often do not properly appreciate the different role of tribal sovereignty in the two analyses. See,
e.g., Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 204.
82
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Although Bracker acknowledged that Indian self-government is ultimately subject to the
broad power of Congress, as discussed in Part III, the Bracker decision has also been
limited by the Supreme Court’s position that the tribes have implicitly lost certain
powers.
III. THE COURT’S IMPOSITION OF NEW LIMITATIONS ON TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
The infringement test was “derived from notions of tribal sovereignty.” 87 As a
result, a discussion of the contours of the infringement test is not complete without a
discussion of two cases that drastically changed the limits of tribal sovereignty: Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and Montana v. United States. These cases severely
circumscribed tribal sovereignty, rendering it unrecognizable from the robust
sovereignty defined by Chief Justice Marshall, where tribes retained all sovereign
powers except the ability to freely alienate their land and have relations with foreign
powers.88
A. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe (1978)
In Oliphant, the Court considered the scope of tribal criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. The defendant in this infamous case was Mark David Oliphant, a nonIndian permanent resident of the Port Madison Reservation of the Suquamish Indian
Tribe.89 At the Suquamish Tribe’s annual Chief Seattle Days celebration, Oliphant
drunkenly assaulted a tribal police officer.90 Oliphant was arrested, and the Suquamish
Tribe prepared to prosecute him in tribal court.91 Oliphant applied for a writ of habeas
corpus in federal district court, challenging the Tribe’s criminal jurisdiction over him
because he was not an Indian.92 Subsequently, Oliphant’s application was denied by
the district court, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. 93 Both the
district court and the Ninth Circuit concluded that preserving law and order within tribal
lands was an indispensable attribute of inherent tribal sovereignty.94 Specifically, the
Ninth Circuit said that “though conquered and dependent, [Indian tribes] retain those
powers of autonomous states that are neither inconsistent with their status nor
expressly terminated by Congress.”95 As a result, the Ninth Circuit said, “criminal
jurisdiction over anyone committing an offense on the reservation is a ‘sine qua non’ of
such powers.”96
The Supreme Court reversed the decision, while at the same time inverting the
limits of tribal sovereignty as defined by Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester. Even
87

Jensen, supra note 15, at 61.
See supra note 36.
89
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. at 194.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 195.
95
Id. at 196 (citing Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976)).
96
Id.
88
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though Congress had passed no law restricting a tribe’s criminal powers over nonIndians, the Court in Oliphant concluded that this power was implicitly lost. After citing to
snippets of case law to support his result, Justice Rehnquist stated that the “retained
powers [of Indian tribes] are not such that they are limited only by specific restrictions in
treaties or congressional enactments.”97 Moreover, he stated, “Indian tribes are
prohibited from exercising both those powers of autonomous states that are expressly
terminated by Congress and those powers inconsistent with their status [as domestic
dependent nations].”98 These statements are irreconcilable with the Marshall trilogy.
Nevertheless, Rehnquist concluded that the Suquamish Tribe, and all other tribes
across the country, lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-members.99
B. Montana v. United States (1981)
In Montana, the Court extended the basic rule of Oliphant to civil cases. The
Court stated that the “exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal
self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status
of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation.”100 The
Court also stated that the “inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to
the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”101
In Worcester the Court said that tribes had power over both Indians and nonIndians on the reservation, unless Congress took that power away. Here, the Court said
that tribes only have power over non-members if Congress explicitly grants this power
to the tribes. Under the formulation in Montana, a state’s attempt to exercise regulatory
authority over non-Indians does not infringe on the right of tribal self-governance unless
it falls under one of the two narrow Montana exceptions.102
IV. THE CURRENT CONTOURS OF THE INFRINGEMENT TEST
Based on the analysis of the cases discussed in Parts II and III, this Part argues
that since Williams v. Lee was decided in 1959, the Supreme Court has substantially
weakened the power of the infringement test to stand as a barrier to state taxation of
non-Indians in Indian Country.
First, the Court has weakened the holding of Williams by concluding that state
tax collection requirements placed on individual tribal members and state regulation that
97
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indirectly affects tribal governments do not violate the infringement test. In Williams, the
Court established a test that would invalidate state action that “infringed on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws andbe ruled by them.”103 In that case, the
act of the Arizona courts exercising jurisdiction over the case of an individual tribal
member violated the infringement test because it “undermined the authority of the tribal
courts.”104 The Williams opinion recognized that state action aimed at individual tribal
members could infringe on the authority of the tribal government. However, in finding
that the infringement test did not bar the State’s collection requirement, the Court in
Moe focused on the fact that Montana’s collection requirement fell on the “Indian
proprietor” as opposed to the tribal government. 105 Because the requirement fell on
individual tribal members, the Court concluded that the state action did not “frustrate
tribal self-government.”106 Yet, with this result, the Court undercut the authority of the
tribal government: the tribal government did not pass the law that required tribal retailers
to collect the state tax, and the laws of Montana ruled tribal sellers rather than the laws
of their tribe. As a result, in Moe the Court takes the position that only state action
directed at tribal governments, as opposed to individual tribal members, would be
invalidated under the infringement test.
In addition, the Court in Colville upheld Washington’s imposition of a tax on tribal
cigarette sales even though it had indirect effects on the tribal governments and their
attempts to raise revenue. As the dissent noted, the tribes had imposed their own tax on
cigarette sales in the hopes of “raising governmental revenues, establishing commercial
enterprises, and escap[ing] from a century of oppression and paternalism.” 107
Nevertheless, the majority concluded that the infringement test did not bar Washington
from imposing its tax on sales to non-Indians. The Court reasoned that the imposition of
the state tax would only indirectly reduce the revenues of the tribal government by
putting the tribal retailers, who would be required to collect both state and tribal taxes, at
a competitive disadvantage compared to off-reservation retailers. Although economic
reality would not permit the tribes to continue to impose their tax on cigarette sales, the
Court concluded that this did not infringe on the right of tribal self-governance.108 Thus,
Moe and Colville illustrate the Court’s willingness to tolerate state regulation or taxation
as long as it does not infringe directly on a tribal government. 109
Second, the Court has weakened the holding of Williams by introducing a
consideration of the state’s interest into the infringement test. As introduced in Williams,
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the infringement test did not consider the state’s interest in determining whether state
authority was permissible; even a very strong state interest would not be permitted if
state regulation infringed on tribal self-government. 110 However, in Colville, the Court
inserted the state’s interest into the infringement analysis. The Court said that “[t]he
principle of tribal self-government, grounded in notions of inherent sovereignty and
congressional policies, seeks an accommodation between the interests of the Tribes
and Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of the State, on the other.” 111
This permitted the Court to conclude that the tribes do not have as significant an
interest in protecting their ability to raise revenues for essential governmental programs
because the value of the cigarettes was not being generated by on-reservation
activities. If the Court were not considering the state’s interest, the fact that the tribes
were marketing an exemption to state taxation, thus reducing state revenue, would be
irrelevant to the infringement analysis. Instead, the Court would have only considered
the tribe’s lost revenue. Although the consideration of the state’s interest might be a
case-specific holding because of the Court’s distaste for individuals who were
“flout[ing]”112 their legal obligation to pay state tax, the Court infused a consideration of
state interest into an analysis that originally only considered the rights of tribes as
limited by Congress.
Finally, the Court has weakened the holding of Williams by severely
circumscribing tribal sovereignty. The infringement test “derive[s] from notions of tribal
sovereignty,”113 and the permissibility of state action under this test changes when the
limits of tribal sovereignty are modified. The current limits of tribal sovereignty are nearly
unrecognizable from those defined by Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester, where state
action in Indian Country was presumptively invalid. First, in Williams and McClanahan,
the Court adopted the view that state taxation or regulation was presumptively valid on
the reservation; the Court would only strike it down if it infringed on tribal selfgovernment or if it was preempted. Next, the Court embraced the theory of implied
divestiture in Oliphant and Montana to drastically circumscribe tribal sovereignty. These
cases concluded that tribes could only exert authority over non-Indians when Congress
explicitly granted such authority. By changing the limits of tribal sovereignty so that the
tribes could not exert their authority over most non-Indians, the Court ensured less state
action would be struck down under the infringement test. Under the definition of tribal
sovereignty after Oliphant and Montana, a state’s imposition of taxes or regulation on
non-Indians does not infringe on tribal self-government because the tribes have been
divested of their authority over non-Indians.
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V. CONCLUSION
As a result of the weakened state of the infringement test, it is misleading to
continue to refer to the test as an independent barrier to state taxation of non-Indians in
Indian Country. The Supreme Court’s opinions have restricted the ability of the
infringement test to invalidate state action to instances in which state action directly
encroaches on tribal governments. Perhaps Justice Rehnquist, who was instrumental in
limiting tribal sovereignty during his tenure on the Court, explained the continuing
importance of the infringement test best. In his dissenting opinion in Ramah, Justice
Rehnquist said that the infringement test precludes state law only “in those rare
instances in which the State attempts to interfere with the residual sovereignty of a tribe
to govern its members.”114
In Mashantucket Tribe of Indians v. Town of Ledyard, the case described at the
beginning of this paper, the Tribe argued that the Town’s tax was preempted by statute,
was preempted by the Bracker interest-balancing test, and impermissibly infringed on
the Tribe’s right of self-government.115 In the opinion, the court did not respond to the
Tribe’s infringement argument, but did strike down Ledyard’s taxation, finding that it was
preempted by statute and under the Bracker interest-balancing test.116 It is impossible to
know whether the court in Mashantucket felt that it did not need to address the Tribe’s
infringement argument because it had already provided two bases for striking down the
tax or because it felt that the infringement test did not stand as a barrier to the tax.
Regardless of why the court in Mashantucket did not address the Tribe’s
infringement argument, the Supreme Court should consider thoughtfully describing the
current contours of the infringement test. The Tenth Circuit in Muscogee was correct
when it said that the Supreme Court “repeated[ly] mention[s]” Williams v. Lee;117
however, the Court rarely engages in any analysis of the cases that would illustrate the
infringement test’s continuing relevance.118 Tribal litigants, like the Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe, deserve to know whether they should continue spending precious space
in their briefs on an infringement argument when challenging state taxation and
regulation on their reservations.
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